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Abstract 
Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) is a longstanding and 
open topic in the theory and practice-of-law. 
Predicting the nature and outcomes of judicial matters 
is abundantly warranted, keenly sought, and 
vigorously pursued by those within the legal industry 
and also by society as a whole. The tenuous act of 
generating judicially laden predictions has been 
limited in utility and exactitude, requiring further 
advancement. Various methods and techniques to 
predict legal cases and judicial actions have emerged 
over time, especially arising via the advent of 
computer-based modeling. There has been a wide 
range of approaches attempted, including simple 
calculative methods to highly sophisticated and 
complex statistical models. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
based approaches have also been increasingly utilized. 
In this paper, a review of the literature encompassing 
Legal Judgment Prediction is undertaken, along with 
innovatively proposing that the advent of AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR) will have a pronounced impact on 
how LJP is performed and its predictive accuracy. 
Legal Judgment Prediction is particularly examined 
using the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal 
Reasoning, plus, other considerations are explored 
including LJP probabilistic tendencies, biases 
handling, actor predictors, transparency, judicial 
reliance, legal case outcomes, and other crucial 
elements entailing the overarching legal judicial 
milieu. 
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1 Background on Legal Judgment Prediction 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, the literature on Legal 
Judgment Prediction is introduced and addressed. 
Doing so establishes the groundwork for the 
subsequent sections. Section 2 introduces the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), 
which is instrumental in the discussions undertaken in 
Section 3. Section 3 provides an indication of the field 
of Legal Judgment Prediction as applied to the LoA 
AILR, along with other vital facets. Section 4 provides 
various additional research implications and 
anticipated impacts upon salient practice-of-law 
considerations. 
 
This paper then consists of these four sections: 
• Section 1: Background on Legal 
                 Judgment Prediction 
• Section 2: Autonomous Levels of  
                        AI Legal Reasoning 
• Section 3: Legal Judgment Prediction and 
                 AI Legal Reasoning 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
 
1.1 Overview of Legal Judgment Prediction 
 
Trying to make predictions about judicial matters is an 
ongoing and longstanding preoccupation that 
continues to be an open issue in both the theory of the 
law and the practice of the law [9] [44] [76] [91]. 
Making predictions about judicial aspects has been 
difficult and remains unresolved as to how to best or 
optimally derive such predictions [62] [78]. The 
advent of computers furthered the effort of making 
judicial predictions by providing a means of readily 
undertaking mathematical calculations and 
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computations to aid in rendering predictions. 
Gradually, as hardware has become faster and less 
costly, and as software has become more advanced, 
the use of a myriad of sophisticated statistical 
techniques and models have also been employed for 
predicting judicial aspects [51] [54] [55] [77]. 
Included amongst these computer-based efforts has 
been the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities, 
such as the use of Natural Language Processing 
(NLP), Machine Learning (ML), Knowledge-Based 
Systems (KBS), and the similar AI-enabled 
technologies and innovations [2] [4] [5] [52] [53] [85]. 
 
The focus of making judicial predictions is often 
referred to as Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP).  
 
For example, Zhong et al [92] describe LJP in this 
manner: “Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) aims to 
predict the judgment result based on the facts of a case 
and becomes a promising application of artificial 
intelligence techniques in the legal field. In real-world 
scenarios, legal judgment usually consists of multiple 
subtasks, such as the decisions of applicable law 
articles, charges, fines, and the term of penalty.” And, 
similarly, this indication of the meaning of Legal 
Judgment Prediction by Xu et al [91]: “Legal 
judgment prediction (LJP) aims to predict a case’s 
judgment results, such as applicable law articles, 
charges, and terms of penalty, based on its fact 
description.” 
 
There have been alternative interpretations of the 
scope associated with the phraseology of Legal 
Judgment Prediction.  
 
Some indicate or infer that the phrasing is akin to a 
solely outcome-oriented viewpoint, while others use 
LJP in a wider meaning as encompassing any 
semblance of judicial decision making. Thus, the 
moniker could be interpreted as “Legal Outcome 
Prediction” or it could be viewed as Legal Decision-
Making Prediction,” a decidedly different connotation. 
The difference is that in the former case the focus and 
scope consist of predominantly aiming to predict the 
judicial result or judicial outcome, only, and doing so 
without any attention to any intermediary judicial 
elements, while in the latter case the predictive interest 
is widely attuned to any form of judicial decision 
making rather than uniquely an outcomes-based aim.  
 
For purposes of this paper, the latter formulation is 
taken as the meaning of Legal Judgment Prediction 
and used in the context of being able to widely predict 
all manner of judicial judgments, wherein “judgment” 
does not refer to solely a final decision or outcome but 
to the presence and use of judicial choices and 
decision making, for which can occur throughout at 
any point during a legal case lifecycle and in other 
judicial contexts too. That being said, it can be 
acknowledged that this widened option provides a 
more arduous hurdle for the effort to craft predictive 
models and render apt predictions. Meanwhile, to be 
clear, the former interpretation would be considered a 
subset of the wider definition, and therefore there is 
nothing somehow inconsistent with the narrower focus 
(it is consistent in the sense that it provides ample 
attention to a specialization or narrow subset within 
the larger set of considerations). 
 
To some, the desire or need to make predictions about 
judicial matters is patently obvious and 
straightforward, suggesting that there ought not to be 
any debate about the intrinsic value in finding ways to 
make such predictions. The logical argument can be 
readily made that prediction is part-and-parcel of most 
everything undertaken in the practice of law, including 
making predictions about how a legal case will fare, 
how a judge will decide a legal matter, etc. As 
succinctly stated by Martin et al [62]: “Legal 
academics, too, possess expertise that should enable 
them to forecast legal events with some accuracy. 
After all, the everyday practice of law requires lawyers 
to predict court decisions in order to advise clients or 
determine litigation strategies.” This points out that if 
the practice of law is greatly in need of being able to 
make judicial predictions, the theory of law and 
scholars of law would presumably be desirous of 
aiding in that quest as a means of furthering the 
underlying matters of law as a body of knowledge and 
a discipline of academic study.  
 
In short, there does not appear to be an overarching 
objection per se to the notion of seeking to make 
judicial predictions and aiming to improve and 
enhance the capability to make such predictions. That 
being said, there are concerns expressed about how the 
act of making judicial predictions can adversely 
impact the rendering of judicial matters, perhaps 
telegraphing beforehand choices that then become 
chosen merely because they were predicted to occur (a 
self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon), or that 
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otherwise influence or shape those judicial judgments 
that have been subject to prediction [19]. Also, there 
are a wide array of ethical questions that arise, such as 
whether sophisticated and AI-based LJP models might 
only be available to those that can afford such 
mechanizations, therefore arming those that can afford 
such accouterments while leaving those that cannot 
afford them a less powerful position of legal armament 
[20]. These societal and legal ramifications are 
certainly noteworthy, though they are not the specific 
purview of this paper, nonetheless, those qualms about 
the potential adverse consequences of LJP are urged 
herein as worthy of ongoing research and attention (as 
mentioned in Section 4). 
 
On a related note, here is a somewhat curt but 
revealing indication of how the self-fulfilling prophecy 
could work its way into efforts to undertake Legal 
Judgement Prediction [20]: “To take a fanciful 
example that proves the point, suppose an attorney in 
arguing to a court states that a team of his investigators 
has been observing the presiding judge every morning. 
The judge walks out of his downtown apartment and 
stops for a quick breakfast either at McDonald's or at 
Dunkin' Donuts. On McDonald's days his decisions 
favor the plaintiff 84 percent of the time. On Dunkin' 
days, his decisions favor the defendant 90 percent of 
the time. The attorney then argues that since he is 
representing the plaintiff, and since the judge this 
morning breakfasted at McDonald's, sound principles 
of statistical sociology require the judge to decide the 
case in favor of his client.” 
 
1.2 SCOTUS As Judicial Predictions Aim 
 
One area of Legal Judgment Prediction that has 
received extensive attention entails making predictions 
about the Supreme Court of the United States 
(SCOTUS), logically so, due to fact that the Supreme 
Court and its several Justices are serving as the highest 
court in the land and the pinnacle at which laws can 
arrive for adjudication within the judicial system of the 
United States. 
 
One of the earliest depicted quantitative analyses 
involving SCOTUS decision predictions was described 
by Kort in 1957 [54]: “This study represents an 
attempt to apply quantitative methods to the prediction 
of human events that generally have been regarded as 
highly uncertain, namely, decisions by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. The study is designed to 
demonstrate that, in at least one area of judicial 
review, it is possible to take some decided cases, to 
identify factual elements that influenced the decisions, 
to derive numerical values for these elements by using 
a formula, and then to predict correctly the decisions 
of the remaining cases in the area specified. The 
analysis will be made independently of what the Court 
said by way of reasoning in these cases; it will rely 
only on the factual elements which have been 
emphasized by the justices in their opinions and on 
their votes to affirm or set aside convictions. Changes 
in Court personnel made no decisive difference in the 
pattern of judicial action in this area; so the analysis 
will not need to take into account the fact that twenty-
five different justices have occupied the nine seats on 
the Court during the period covered, i.e., the past 
quarter century.” 
 
Next, Lawlor et al [56] in the early 1960s described 
how computers were being used to predict SCOTUS 
decisions, and offered in their paper an indication of 
specific application to right-to-counsel cases. Keep in 
mind that computers in that era were relatively slow 
and less capable than today’s computers, and costlier 
to leverage, yet pointedly were already beginning to be 
used for LJP efforts. As stated by Grunbaum et al [41] 
in that same 1960’s time period: “Predictions of the 
outcome of litigation by statistical methods is a 
relatively new and controversial field of study made 
possible by computers.” 
 
It would seem that almost immediately upon 
leveraging computers for undertaking Legal Judgment 
Prediction that debates over the appropriate or best 
means to construct such predictive models or 
calculations came to the forefront. For example, 
Grunbaum et al [41] shared insights into whether the 
unit of prediction should be the SCOTUS overall 
outcome or decision, or whether the focal point should 
be on the Supreme Court Justices per se, and examined 
numerous studies at that time, reaching this 
conclusion: “They show that individual Justices, rather 
than the Court as a whole, should be used as the unit of 
prediction.” Debate and lack of agreement over the 
“best” unit of prediction for LJP continue to this day, 
remaining unsettled and undeniably a still unresolved 
question. 
 
Beyond the question of the unit of prediction, there 
was also effort involved in trying to ascertain which 
model or statistical approach might be better suited for 
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Legal Judgment Prediction. Nagel in 1963 proffered 
this [68]: “This article illustrates and systematically 
compares three methods for quantitatively predicting 
case outcomes. The three methods are correlation, 
regression, and discriminant analysis, all of which 
involve standard social science research techniques.” 
The focus was about SCOTUS [68]: “The cases used 
to illustrate the methods consist of 149 civil liberties 
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court 
from 1956 through 1960.” 
 
The predictor variables of interest by Nagel in the 
1963 paper were [68]: “All three methods rely on the 
relationship between case outcomes and various 
predictor variables. In this article, the outcome to be 
predicted is whether a given civil liberties case will be 
decided in the direction of narrowing civil liberties or 
in the direction of broadening civil liberties.” And, as 
indicative of that time period, punch cards were used 
to feed the data into the statistical programs being used 
[68]: “To use a computer program for regression or 
discriminant analysis, one punched card per case is 
needed unless the number of variables necessitates the 
use of more. Certain columns on each card should be 
set aside for each variable. Thus, if hole 1 is punched 
on column 12 of the card corresponding to case 23, 
this punch might indicate that a certain variable was 
present.” 
 
During the 1980s, SCOTUS predictive models became 
more pronounced in using several variables as part of 
the computational approaches, and also emphasized 
the importance of utilizing the models as both being 
predictive and potentially being explanatory as to 
judicial behavior and judgment. This is illustrated via 
Segal [77]: “The overwhelming consensus of Fourth 
Amendment scholars is that the Supreme Court's sea 
and seizure cases are a mess. This article proposes that 
the confusion arises from the manner in which the 
cases were studied, not from the decisions themselves. 
A legal model with variables that include the prior 
justification of the search, the nature of the intrusion, 
and a few mitigating circumstance used to explain the 
Court's decisions on the reasonableness of a given 
search or seizure. The parameters are estimated 
through probit. The results show that the search and 
seizure cases are much more ordered than had 
commonly been believed. Virtually all of the estimates 
are as expected. Additionally, the Court is shown to 
act favorably toward the federal government than 
toward the states. Preliminary analysis suggests the 
model has predictive as well as explanatory value.” 
 
In more recent times, the SCOTUS predictive models 
have gradually advanced beyond one-dimensional 
versions and become multi-dimensional. This is 
highlighted by the work of Lauderdale and Clark [55]: 
“One-dimensional spatial models have come to inform 
much theorizing and research on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. However, we argue that judicial preferences 
vary considerably across areas of the law, and that 
limitations in our ability to measure those preferences 
have constrained the set of questions scholars pursue. 
We introduce a new approach, which makes use of 
information about substantive similarity among cases, 
to estimate judicial preferences that vary across 
substantive legal issues and over time. We show that a 
model allowing preferences to vary over substantive 
issues as well as over time is a significantly better 
predictor of judicial behavior than one that only allows 
preferences to vary over time. We find that judicial 
preferences are not reducible to simple left-right 
ideology and, as a consequence, there is substantial 
variation in the identity of the median justice across 
areas of the law during all periods of the modern court. 
These results suggest a need to reconsider empirical 
and theoretical research that hinges on the existence of 
a single pivotal median justice.” 
 
There has also been keen interest in exploring the use 
of classification trees as a means to aid in bolstering 
the Legal Judgment Prediction capacity, once again 
using SCOTUS as an aim for making judicial 
predictions, per Kastellec [51]: “A key question in the 
quantitative study of legal rules and judicial decision 
making is the structure of the relationship between 
case facts and case outcomes. Legal doctrine and legal 
rules are general attempts to define this relationship. 
This article summarizes and utilizes a statistical 
method relatively unexplored in political science and 
legal scholarship—classification trees—that offers a 
flexible way to study legal doctrine. I argue that this 
method, while not replacing traditional statistical tools 
for studying judicial decisions, can better capture 
many aspects of the relationship between case facts 
and case outcomes. To illustrate the method's 
advantages, I conduct classification tree analyses of 
search and seizure cases decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and confession cases decided by the courts of 
appeals. These analyses illustrate the ability of 
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classification trees to increase our understanding of 
legal rules and legal doctrine.” 
 
This brings us to the latest variants of studying and 
attempting to predict SCOTUS, including the work by 
Katz et al [52]. Making use of an AI-like technique 
consisting of time-evolving random forest classifiers, 
here is the nature of their Legal Judgment Prediction 
efforts: “Building on developments in machine 
learning and prior work in the science of judicial 
prediction, we construct a model designed to predict 
the behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in a generalized, out-of-sample context. To do so, we 
develop a time-evolving random forest classifier that 
leverages unique feature engineering to predict more 
than 240,000 justice votes and 28,000 cases outcomes 
over nearly two centuries (1816-2015). Using only 
data available prior to decision, our model outperforms 
null (baseline) models at both the justice and case level 
under both parametric and non-parametric tests. Over 
nearly two centuries, we achieve 70.2% accuracy at 
the case outcome level and 71.9% at the justice vote 
level. More recently, over the past century, we 
outperform an in-sample optimized null model by 
nearly 5%. Our performance is consistent with, and 
improves on the general level of prediction 
demonstrated by prior work; however, our model is 
distinctive because it can be applied out-of-sample to 
the entire past and future of the Court, not a single 
term. Our results represent an important advance for 
the science of quantitative legal prediction and portend 
a range of other potential applications.” 
 
Part of the impetus for the approach used by Katz et al 
was stated as due to faltering or weaknesses in prior 
works of Legal Judgment Prediction, namely 
containing these faults or limitations [52]: “Despite the 
multitude of pundits and vast human effort devoted to 
the task, the quality of the resulting predictions and the 
underlying models supporting most forecasts is 
unclear. Not only are these models not backtested 
historically, but many are difficult to formalize or 
reproduce at all. When models are formalized, they are 
typically assessed ex post to infer causes, rather than 
used ex ante to predict future cases.” 
 
This raises an important point about the assumed 
underlying principle about much of the Legal 
Judgment Prediction capacities, pointedly that the 
primary means of making a prediction is often lacking 
in being reproducible and that one-instance exemplars 
do little to showcase true predictive power. In 
addition, the facet that reliance upon prior data can be 
detrimental over-reliance [52]: ‘Court outcomes are 
potentially influenced by a variety of dynamics, 
including public opinion, inter-branch conflict, both 
changing membership and shifting views of the 
Justices, and judicial norms and procedures. The 
classic adage ‘past performance does not necessarily 
predict future results’ is very much applicable.” 
 
Besides ultimately comparing the predictions of LJP to 
the actual outcomes, another avenue of gauging the 
efficacy of LJP models involves the use of legal 
experts that are asked to make predictions too, as 
indicated in Martin et al [62]: “Employing two 
different methods, we attempted to predict the 
outcome of every case pending before the Supreme 
Court during its October 2002 term and compared 
those predictions to the actual decisions. One method 
used a statistical forecasting model based on 
information derived from past Supreme Court 
decisions. The other captured the expert judgments of 
legal academics and professionals. Using these two 
distinct methods allows us to test their predictive 
power not only against actual Court outcomes, but also 
against each other.” 
 
As to the rationale for utilizing both statistical 
modeling and the polling of legal experts, the basis is 
depicted this way [62]: “The critical difference 
between the two methods of prediction lies not in the 
law/politics dichotomy, but in the nature of the inputs 
used to generate predictions. The statistical model 
looked at only a handful of case characteristics, each 
of them gross features easily observable without 
specialized training. The legal experts, by contrast, 
could use particularized knowledge, such as the 
specific facts of the case or statements by individual 
justices in similar cases. The statistical model also 
differed from the experts in explicitly taking into 
account every case decided by this natural court prior 
to the 2002 term. No individual could have such 
comprehensive knowledge of the Court’s output for 
the last eight terms, and so the experts necessarily 
relied on fewer (albeit more detailed) observations of 
past Court behavior. Not surprisingly, these different 
decision-making processes often resulted in divergent 
predictions in particular cases.” 
 
Arising from the advent of online access and the 
widespread Internet, some assert that Legal Judgment 
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Prediction can be or should be more than the running 
of computer-based programs, incorporating the 
opinions and predictions of human experts about 
judicial matters, and even going so far as including a 
larger audience of human predictors via the use of a 
modern-day crowdsourcing approach [52]: “Future 
research will seek to find the optimal blend of experts, 
crowds, and algorithms as some ensemble of these 
three streams of intelligence likely will produce the 
best performing model for a wide class of prediction 
problems.” 
 
1.3 AI and Legal Judgment Prediction 
 
As earlier indicated, AI has increasingly been utilized 
for Legal Judgment Prediction, as illustrated via some 
of the SCOTUS prediction studies mentioned in 
Section 1.2. Enlarging the viewpoint beyond 
SCOTUS, AI is being used in numerous ways for a 
variety of judicial milieu. 
 
For example, in the work by Aletras et al [2], the use 
of NLP and ML was employed for predicting legal 
cases of the European Court of Human Rights: 
“Recent advances in Natural Language Processing and 
Machine Learning provide us with the tools to build 
predictive models that can be used to unveil patterns 
driving judicial decisions. This can be useful, for both 
lawyers and judges, as an assisting tool to rapidly 
identify cases and extract patterns which lead to 
certain decisions. This paper presents the first 
systematic study on predicting the outcome of cases 
tried by the European Court of Human Rights based 
solely on textual content. We formulate a binary 
classification task where the input of our classifiers is 
the textual content extracted from a case and the target 
output is the actual judgment as to whether there has 
been a violation of an article of the convention of 
human rights. Textual information is represented using 
contiguous word sequences, i.e., N-grams, and topics. 
Our models can predict the court’s decisions with a 
strong accuracy (79% on average). Our empirical 
analysis indicates that the formal facts of a case are the 
most important predictive factor. This is consistent 
with the theory of legal realism suggesting that judicial 
decision-making is significantly affected by the 
stimulus of the facts. We also observe that the topical 
content of a case is another important feature in this 
classification task and explore this relationship further 
by conducting a qualitative analysis.” 
 
An important point in these studies includes the facet 
that there are judicial factors at play, along with the 
need to consider so-called non-legal factors that 
nonetheless impact the predictive capacity for Legal 
Judgment Predictions [2]: “These results could be 
understood as providing some evidence for judicial 
decision-making approaches according to which 
judges are primarily responsive to non-legal, rather 
than to legal, reasons when they decide appellate 
cases.” 
 
When stated bluntly, one viewpoint is that the justices 
themselves are not merely some form of automata that 
render legal rulings in a logically and purely 
mathematically systematic way, instead of as indicated 
by Grunbaum [40]: “And lastly . . . maybe it should be 
firstly . .. judges have personalities. They have 
prejudices and stomach aches and pride and stalled 
cars and inspirations and hangovers and far visions 
and sore feet. All judges try, and most succeed in 
reducing the impact of ‘gastronomical jurisprudence,’ 
but few reduce its effect to zero. For after all judges 
are. . . thanks be to Heaven . . . human. They are not 
computers controlled by always knowable inputs. 
Neither are they scientists indifferently imposing 
inexorable rules. They are only humans, judging only 
humans, hopefully themselves in turn to be similarly 
judged.” 
 
Per the discussion in Section 1.1, Legal Judgment 
Prediction can be viewed in a larger context than the 
sole focus of judicial outcomes, and for which an 
example of AI used to predict billings or legal fee 
charges for a given legal case indicates this wide 
interpretation [59]: “The charge prediction task is to 
determine appropriate charges for a given case, which 
is helpful for legal assistant systems where the user 
input is fact description. We argue that relevant law 
articles play an important role in this task, and 
therefore propose an attention-based neural network 
method to jointly model the charge prediction task and 
the relevant article extraction task in a unified 
framework. The experimental results show that, 
besides providing legal basis, the relevant articles can 
also clearly improve the charge prediction results, and 
our full model can effectively predict appropriate 
charges for cases with different expression styles.” 
 
This particular study also raises the point that the 
source materials used for making Legal Judgment 
Predictions do not necessarily need to be only legal 
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documents or artifacts, and could very well be 
potentially “non-legal” materials too, such as news 
related elements [59]: “By experimenting on news 
data, we show that, although trained on judgment 
documents, our model also has reasonable 
generalization ability on fact descriptions written by 
non-legal professionals. While promising, our model 
still cannot explicitly handle multidefendant cases, and 
there is also a clear gap between our model and the 
upper bound improvement that relevant articles can 
achieve.” 
 
One concern raised about the use of AI and in 
particular Machine Learning is that the data used as 
input is oftentimes required to be pre-labeled, tending 
to entail manual and labor-intensive efforts to get the 
data into suitable categorization for use by the ML 
models. This point is raised by Xu et al [91]: “Existing 
approaches for legal judgment prediction (LJP) are 
mainly divided into three categories. In early times, 
works usually focus on analyzing existing legal cases 
in specific scenarios with mathematical and statistical 
algorithms. However, these methods are limited to 
small datasets with few labels. Later, a number of 
machine learning-based methods were developed to 
solve the problem of LJP, which almost combine some 
manually designed features with a linear classifier to 
improve the performance of case classification. The 
shortcoming is that these methods rely heavily on 
manual features, which suffer from the generalization 
problem. In recent years, researchers tend to exploit 
neural networks to solve LJP tasks.” 
 
The work by Xu et al [91] proposes an innovative 
means to cope with these issues: “To solve the 
confusing charges issue, we propose an end-to-end 
framework, i.e., Law Article Distillation based 
Attention Network (LADAN). LADAN uses the 
difference among similar law articles to attentively 
extract features from law cases’ fact descriptions, 
which is more effective in distinguishing confusing 
law articles, and improve the performance of LJP.”  
And as further elaborated [91]: “For an input law case, 
we learn both macro- and microlevel features. Macro-
level features are used for predicting which 
community includes the applicable law articles. Micro-
level features are attentively extracted by the attention 
vector of the selected community for distinguishing 
confusing law articles within the same community.” 
 
Extending the notion of looking beyond the outcome 
itself, and thus considering intermediary states of a 
legal case, the work by Keown [53] provides a 
methodical means of using a state-of-the-case series of 
pinpoints or junctures as part of the mathematical 
modeling for Legal Judgment Prediction, as described 
this way: “The fact pattern underlying a judicial 
decision comprises issues that may be classified either 
as (1) evidence and argument supporting the position 
of plaintiff denoted by the symbol P, or (2) evidence 
and argument supporting that of defendant denoted by 
D. In law, of course, who is plaintiff and who is 
defendant may depend on which party wins the race to 
the courthouse, rather than on the nature of the dispute 
involved.” 
 
Furthermore, this [53]: “In civil cases, plaintiff wins 
his case if the trier of fact, sometimes a judge and 
sometimes a jury, finds a preponderance of the 
evidence in his favor. Considering D and P as 
conflicting factors in a judicial process enjoying a 
suitably discontinuous behavior, one arrives by means 
of the Zeemanian process at: Hypothesis I. The 
standard model of the judicial process is a cusp 
catastrophe with plaintiffs evidence and argument 
denoted by P and defendant's evidence and argument 
denoted by D as conflicting factors determining the 
outcome.” And then emphases the states in time facets 
[53]: “As intended, these terms indicate that, with 
certain exceptions to be discussed below, the state of 
the case is (defined by a point on the behavior 
manifold that indicates a victory either for plaintiff or 
for defendant at any given time). If the state of the 
case is represented by a point on judgment for 
plaintiff, then it tends to remain there, while if it is 
represented by a point on judgment for the defendant 
then by stable equilibrium it tends to remain there. A 
state of the case in which the outcome is uncertain 
corresponds to a point on the cross-hatched surface 
representing a situation of unstable equilibrium. Thus, 
continued introduction of evidence and further 
argument soon displaces the state either to judgment 
for plaintiff or judgment for defendant.” 
 
Much of the literature on Legal Judgment Prediction 
tends to suggest that it is insufficient to make a 
prediction as though being out-of-the-blue or by some 
divine means, and argues at times quite vigorously that 
being able to sensibly or reasonably explain how the 
prediction was derived is perhaps as important as the 
prediction itself. Consider the points made by Ashley 
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and Bruninghaus [4] in their efforts to construct their 
Issue-Based Prediction (IBP) approach: 
“Computerized algorithms for predicting the outcomes 
of legal problems can extract and present information 
from particular databases of cases to guide the legal 
analysis of new problems. They can have practical 
value despite the limitations that make reliance on 
predictions risky for other real-world purposes such as 
estimating settlement values. An algorithm's ability to 
generate reasonable legal arguments also is important. 
In this article, computerized prediction algorithms are 
compared not only in terms of accuracy, but also in 
terms of their ability to explain predictions and to 
integrate predictions and arguments. Our approach, the 
Issue-Based Prediction algorithm, is a program that 
tests hypotheses about how issues in a new case will 
be decided. It attempts to explain away 
counterexamples inconsistent with a hypothesis, while 
apprising users of the counterexamples and making 
explanatory arguments based on them.” 
 
As a further extension of this explanatory notion, the 
IBP was enhanced as SMILE+IBP, as described in [5]: 
“Work on a computer program called SMILE + IBP 
(SMart Index Learner Plus Issue-Based Prediction) 
bridges case-based reasoning and extracting 
information from texts. The program addresses a 
technologically challenging task that is also very 
relevant from a legal viewpoint: to extract information 
from textual descriptions of the facts of decided cases 
and apply that information to predict the outcomes of 
new cases. The program attempts to automatically 
classify textual descriptions of the facts of legal 
problems in terms of Factors, a set of classification 
concepts that capture stereotypical fact patterns that 
effect the strength of a legal claim, here trade secret 
misappropriation. Using these classifications, the 
program can evaluate and explain predictions about a 
problem’s outcome given a database of previously 
classified cases. This paper provides an extended 
example illustrating both functions, prediction by IBP 
and text classification by SMILE, and reports 
empirical evaluations of each. While IBP’s results are 
quite strong, and SMILE’s much weaker, 
SMILE + IBP still has some success predicting and 
explaining the outcomes of case scenarios input as 
texts. It marks the first time to our knowledge that a 
program can reason automatically about legal case 
texts.” 
 
As also mentioned in Section 1.1, not everyone 
necessarily concurs that making judicial predictions is 
appropriate, regardless of how it is undertaken, which 
recently came to the fore when France banned certain 
aspects of publishing judge analytics in 2019, as 
indicated in [84]: “France has banned the publication 
of judge analytics, and breaking this law carries up to 
five years in prison. The new Article 33 of the Justice 
Reform Act reads: ‘No personally identifiable data 
concerning judges or court clerks may be subject to 
any reuse with the purpose or result of evaluating, 
analyzing or predicting their actual or supposed 
professional practices. The violation of this law shall 
be punished by the measures outlined in articles 226-
18, 226-24, and 226-31 of the penal code, without 
prejudice of the measures and sanctions provided for 
under the law 78-17 of 6 January 1978 concerning data 
processing, files and freedoms,’ as translated by 
Rebecca Loescher, a professor of French at St. 
Edward’s University at the Angers, France campus. 
The law appears to apply to anyone—individuals, 
researchers, technology companies.” 
 
Returning to the point about aiming solely at the 
outcome of a legal case, it is perhaps confounding to 
consider exactly what is considered the outcome if 
there is a possibility that a case might be appealed. In 
other words, when referring to an outcome, does the 
outcome imply the true final outcome after all appeals 
have been exhausted and potentially a final court has 
ruled or does outcome refer to the initial ruling or 
judgment about a legal case. Per Atkinson et al [7]: 
“The point is that the outcome of a case is often not 
clear:  in any serious legal dispute there are opposing 
arguments, and very often opinions differ as to who 
has the better of it.  Decisions are reversed on appeal, 
and may be reversed again at the highest level of 
appeal.” 
 
And, once again, theory dovetails into the Legal 
Judgment Prediction realm and as embodied perhaps 
in AI efforts as depicted by McCarty [63]: “Using a 
variety of schemes to represent different kinds of 
argument (such as Argument from Expert Opinion, 
Argument from Negative Consequences, Argument 
from Rules, etc.) was introduced into AI and Law.  
Argumentation schemes can be seen as a 
generalisation of the rules of inference.” In fact, there 
is an argument to be made that predictions should be 
based upon and potentially preceded with a strong 
theory construction about the law [7]: “Some 
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researchers have argued that reasoning with legal cases 
should be seen as a process of theory construction, 
following the ideas of McCarty.  The idea is to 
construct a theory which will explain the past cases 
and determine an outcome for the current case.” 
 
This also potentially recognizes the multitude of 
subtasks within a legal case and the potential for 
modeling those subtasks as part of the outcome-
focused predictions, utilizing a Directed Acyclic 
Graph approach [92]: “While most existing works only 
focus on a specific subtask of judgment prediction and 
ignore the dependencies among subtasks, we formalize 
the dependencies among subtasks as a Directed 
Acyclic Graph (DAG) and propose a topological 
multi-task learning framework, TOPJUDGE, which 
incorporates multiple subtasks and DAG dependencies 
into judgment prediction. We conduct experiments on 
several real-world large-scale datasets of criminal 
cases in the civil law system. Experimental results 
show that our model achieves consistent and 
significant improvements over baselines on all 
judgment prediction tasks.” 
 
As indicative of the legal case lifecycle and the role of 
Legal Judgment Prediction, consider these types of 
questions that are customarily asked about a legal case 
[78]: “Usually, the process of prediction starts with 
one or more questions. Whether to take a case in hand 
or not? Whether to settle the case outside or take it to 
the court? Will the settlement amount be worth it? 
What are the chances of winning the case? These are 
some of the questions that involve predicting the 
outcome of a case and the legal practitioners have to 
deal with, on a regular basis. These questions represent 
the importance of outcome prediction in case 
selection, making settlement decisions, and various 
aspects of legal processes.” 
 
Consider too that there are judicial per se factors and 
then there are extra-judicial factors to be encompassed 
when performing LJP [78]: “Considering the fact that 
judges are human beings, this approach assumes that 
judges may be ideologically inclined towards some 
side in various issues, have their own perception and 
other biases, and various other social and political 
factors that affect their judgment such as mental 
resources of a judge and decision of lower court. 
Hence, descriptors considered for predicting outcomes 
are extra-judicial factors that may generate or 
represent human bias. Examples of these factors are 
votes of other justices, justice gender, case origin, 
petitioner type, respondent type, the ideological 
direction of the court, etc.” 
 
Besides conventional numeric coding of judicial 
factors, there is also a linguistic approach that can be 
utilized for Legal Judgment Prediction, as indicated in 
[78]: “Another approach considers the linguistic 
features of legal judgments for predicting outcomes. 
Ngo tried to predict outcomes on a database of 2019 
Dutch legal cases according to their linguistic features. 
Some of the considered features were word count and 
frequency of different types of pronouns. In, the 
authors replaced case-specific names and instances by 
their role and used propositional patterns for predicting 
trade secret cases.” 
 
For those seeking to establish law as a form of science, 
one that would adhere to rigorous principles of nature 
and be readily described via formulas and the means of 
science, and thus presumably be more readily 
predicted and predictable, Noonan offers this thought 
in his 1961 work about the law [69]: “Other sciences 
may be more easily circumscribed. Their subject 
matter is defined by the Baconian purpose for which 
they are normally pursued: the prediction and control 
of the properties of a particular kind of physical 
matter. It would appear that a similar ambition to 
achieve prediction and control ‘like a science’ may 
have animated such Austinian offshoots as Legal 
Realism.” 
 
1.4 Theories of Law and LJP 
 
Embroiled within Legal Judgment Prediction is the 
role of underlying theories about the law.  
 
In particular, there has been much focus on the 
emergence of legal realism versus legal formalism, 
and thus this carries over inevitably into the predictive 
realm too [2]: “Without going into details with respect 
to a particularly complicated debate that is out of the 
scope of this paper, we may here simplify by 
observing that since the beginning of the 20th century, 
there has been a major contention between two 
opposing ways of making sense of judicial decision-
making: legal formalism and legal realism. Very 
roughly, legal formalists have provided a legal 
model of judicial decision-making, claiming that the 
law is rationally determinate: judges either decide 
cases deductively, by subsuming facts under formal 
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legal rules or use more complex legal reasoning than 
deduction whenever legal rules are insufficient to 
warrant a particular outcome. On the other hand, legal 
realists have criticized formalist models, insisting that 
judges primarily decide appellate cases by responding 
to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than on 
the basis of legal rules or doctrine, which are in many 
occasions rationally indeterminate.” 
 
Seeking to encompass these underlying tensions of 
legal theories, a study by Hall and Wright utilized 
content analysis, whose roots can be said to 
epistemologically be in the legal realism realm, as 
described in [44]: “To provide methodological 
guidance, we survey the questions that legal scholars 
have tried to answer through content analysis, and use 
that experience to generalize about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the technique compared with 
conventional interpretive legal methods. The 
epistemological roots of content analysis lie in legal 
realism. Any question that a lawyer might ask about 
what courts say or do can be studied more objectively 
using one of the four distinct components of content 
analysis: 1) replicable selection of cases; 2) objective 
coding of cases; 3) counting case contents for 
descriptive purposes; or 4) statistical analysis of case 
coding.” 
 
The researchers point out that there are noted 
objections to such an approach [44]: “Each of these 
components contributes something of unique 
epistemological value to legal research, yet at each of 
these four stages, some legal scholars have objected to 
the technique. The most effective response is to 
recognize that content analysis does not occupy the 
same epistemological ground as conventional legal 
scholarship. Instead, each method renders different 
kinds of insights that complement each other, so that, 
together, the two approaches to understanding caselaw 
are more powerful that either alone. Content analysis 
is best used when each decision should receive equal 
weight, that is, when it is appropriate to regard the 
content of opinions as generic data.” 
 
The argument for content analysis is further made 
[44]: “Scholars have found that it is especially useful 
in studies that question or debunk conventional legal 
wisdom. Content analysis also holds promise in the 
study of the connections between judicial opinions and 
other parts of the social, political, or economic 
landscape. The strongest application is when the 
subject of study is simply the behavior of judges in 
writing opinions or deciding cases. Then, content 
analysis combines the analytical skills of the lawyer 
with the power of science that comes from articulated 
and replicable methods.” 
 
As earlier emphasized in Section 1.1, there can be 
problematic issues underlying the approaches used for 
Legal Judgment Prediction, including this aspect 
highlighted about the use of content analysis [44]: 
“However, analyzing the cause-and-effect relationship 
between the outcome of cases and the legally relevant 
factors presented by judges to justify their decisions 
raises a serious circularity problem. Therefore, content 
analysis is not an especially good tool for helping 
lawyers to predict the outcome of cases based on real-
world facts. This article also provides guidance on the 
best practices for using this research method. We 
identify techniques that meet standards of social 
science rigor and account for the practical needs of 
legal researchers. These techniques include methods 
for case sampling, coder training, reliability testing, 
and statistical analysis.” 
 
1.5 Holmes And The Path Of The Law 
 
It would seem that any in-depth discussion about 
prediction and the law, which entails any notable 
theoretical semblance, would be inclined or perhaps 
obligated to address the now-classic “prediction theory 
of the law” as commonly prompted by the work of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1897 “The Path of the 
Law” work [40]. For those not familiar with the 
premise, Holmes could be construed as arguing that 
law is to its essence a form of a prediction. 
 
This is worthwhile for elucidation and detailed 
consideration in these matters on Legal Judgment 
Prediction. 
 
A singular quote of Holmes has been promulgated 
time and again over the years, of which there is a 
multitude of interpretations about the purported 
meaning, that quote being this one [40]: ‘The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” 
 
Before examining the myriad of interpretations, it is 
instructive to consider the overall context of what else 
Holmes indicated and how his famous article arrived 
at that particular statement or sentiment. 
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First, Holmes indicates that law is weighed in the 
minds of the public as to the amount of governmental 
force that can be applied to ensure that the law itself is 
abided by, such that [40]: “People want to know under 
what circumstances and how far they will run the risk 
of coming against what is so much stronger than 
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find 
out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our 
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the 
incidence of the public force through the 
instrumentality of the courts.” 
 
In that frame of thinking, laws can be considered 
prophecies or predictions about how the ax, as it were, 
might fall upon someone [40]: ”The means of the 
study are a body of reports, of treatises, and of statutes, 
in this country and in England, extending back for six 
hundred years, and now increasing annually by 
hundreds. In these sibylline leaves are gathered the 
scattered prophecies of the past upon the cases in 
which the axe will fall. These are what properly have 
been called the oracles of the law. Far the most 
important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of 
every new effort of legal thought is to make these 
prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a 
thoroughly connected system.” 
 
To reiterate then, in Holmes own words, the law is a 
prediction of what can befall those that possibly avert 
the law [40]: “But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty 
so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does 
or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this 
or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a legal 
right.” And to add emphasis, he states: “I wish, if I 
can, to lay down some first principles for the study of 
this body of dogma or systematized prediction which 
we call the law, for men who want to use it as the 
instrument of their business to enable them to 
prophesy in their turn, and, as bearing upon the study, 
I wish to point out an ideal which as yet our law has 
not attained.” 
 
This then leads to the famous line, which is shown 
herein in the context of both the preceding background 
and the entire passage of which the line occurs (it is 
the last sentence here) [40]: “Take the fundamental 
question, What constitutes the law? You will find 
some text writers telling you that it is something 
different from what is decided by the courts of 
Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, 
that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or 
admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not 
coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of 
our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not 
care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that 
he does want to know what the Massachusetts or 
English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of 
this mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law.” 
 
As an aside, some object to the characterization of 
“bad man” or “bad men” to which the law is 
apparently aimed (in today’s terminology it would be 
bad people, which is likely what Holmes had 
intended), and per Hart, the pointed question is asked 
[46]: "Why should not law be equally if not more 
concerned with the 'puzzled man' or 'ignorant man' 
who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be 
told what it is? Or with the 'man who wishes to 
arrange his affairs' if only he can be told how to do it?" 
This aside is not addressed in this paper herein and 
merely noted as one of various criticisms or analyses 
that have been made of Holmes's statements and 
philosophy about the law. 
 
Continuing, what is perhaps equally crucial in the 
viewpoint expressed by Holmes is that it is not merely 
the words of the law that are crucial, but also and 
perhaps as much so (or more) the operationalizing of 
the law too [40]: “You see how the vague 
circumference of the notion of {legal} duty shrinks 
and at the same time grows more precise when we 
wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except 
the object of our study, the operations of the law.”  
 
As a point that has become commonly cited about the 
law presumably (possibly) not being amenable to 
logic, and perhaps not amenable to mathematical 
modeling and computations that might attempt to 
embody or utilize it for predictive purposes, here’s 
what Holmes stated [40]: “So in the broadest sense it 
is true that the law is a logical development, like 
everything else. The danger of which I speak is not the 
admission that the principles governing other 
phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a 
given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out 
like mathematics from some general axioms of 
conduct. 
 
Furthermore, the law can turn on a dime, one might 
assert, and presumably undercut the notion of the past 
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being used to predict the future [40]: “Such matters 
really are battle grounds where the means do not exist 
for the determinations that shall be good for all time, 
and where the decision can do no more than embody 
the preference of a given body in a given time and 
place. We do not realize how large a part of our law is 
open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the 
habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is 
self-evident, no matter how ready we may be to accept 
it, not even Mr. Herbert Spencer’s ‘Every man has a 
right to do what he wills, provided he interferes not 
with a like right on the part of his neighbors.’” 
 
There is though a role, an important one, in applying 
overarching statistics and economic postulates to the 
prediction of the predictions: “The rational study of 
law is still to a large extent the study of history. 
History must be a part of the study, because without it 
we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is 
our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, 
because it is the first step toward an enlightened 
skepticism, that is, towards a deliberate 
reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you 
get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see 
just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the 
first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him 
and make him a useful animal. For the rational study 
of the law the blackletter man may be the man of the 
present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.” Along with this point 
too [40]: “The statistics of the relative increase of 
crime in crowded places like large cities, where 
example has the greatest chance to work, and in less 
populated parts, where the contagion spreads more 
slowly, have been used with great force in favor of the 
latter view. But there is weighty authority for the 
belief that, however this may be, ‘not the nature of the 
crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, 
constitutes the only reasonable legal criterion to guide 
the inevitable social reaction against the criminal.’” 
 
Out of this array of vital considerations about the law 
has become an assertion that these points can arrive at 
a contention that the courts and judges are ultimately 
the true determiners of what the law is.  
Rather than being in the role of law-applier, which in 
theory the courts and judges are supposed to be 
focused and limited to thereof, it has been interpreted 
that Holmes was arguing that the courts and the judges 
are instead the lawmakers, in lieu of the legislature 
that was presumed to be the lawmakers. This is argued 
under the assertion that the courts and the judges are 
the final arbiters of the meaning of the law, along with 
the applying of the forces that Holmes argued are the 
basis for why the laws are seen as having teeth and 
thus the foundational face for the public to consider 
when abiding by the laws. 
 
If a law is a predictor of the potential force to be 
applied, but the courts and the judges can sway that 
“law” in whatever manner so desired, the law itself no 
longer is as meaningful as is the judgment that the 
courts and judges will make, regardless potentially of 
what the law otherwise seemingly appears to signify. 
Thus, this leads to the logical conclusion that the focus 
for Legal Judgment Prediction should not be to the law 
itself, being a mere secondary or surrogate at best, but 
instead to the courts and judges as to their judgments 
(and potential whims, some would argue). As 
described by D’Amato [20]: “The judge who finds it 
more interesting to invent new law rather than restate 
the old is stealthily undermining public confidence in 
the rule of law and narrowing the ambit of personal 
freedom. He is acting as a legislator, not a judge—a 
legislator of the worst sort, who enacts new law and 
holds it against innocent people who were dutifully 
complying with the old law. If the judge in addition 
believes that he embodies the law, he is saying that, if 
the public wants to understand the law, they should 
study him. For in the end he has no theory of law. He 
cannot explain what the law is; he can only say that 
law is what he does—but he does not say that it is a 
shortcoming on his part that he cannot explain what 
the law is. Instead it is a failing on the law's part!” 
 
Indeed, this active role of lawmaking can be construed 
as a form of reverse legislation [20]: “A judge who 
invents a rule and applies it retroactively to conduct 
that has already occurred seems to be engaging in a 
kind of reverse legislation. If in doing so the judge 
changes the law retroactively, then indeed it would be 
reverse-perverse legislation-penalizing a party for 
failure to obey a rule that the judge has just invented. 
But if the judge just finds the law as it existed when 
the facts of the case arose, then the judge is not 
making new law but only taking a picture of the old—
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the same picture the litigants could have taken when 
their case arose.” 
 
Returning to the Holmes remark about the law as a 
prophecy, subsequent to Holmes points becoming 
popularized, many interpreted that this meant that 
lawyers are essentially like weather predictors [20]: 
“After hearing Holmes speak, the scholars and 
practitioners in the audience undoubtedly understood 
him to be comparing a lawyer with other public 
predictors of events such as weather forecasters. This 
particular comparison has become the standard 
interpretation of Holmes’s prediction theory. Thus a 
lawyer predicts judicial decisions (which constitute the 
law), and the meteorologist predicts tomorrow’s 
weather.” 
 
Per D’Amato [20], this opened a can of worms amid 
the legal profession: “It may be warranted to say that 
legal realism was a disastrous setback for American 
law. It seemed to justify as an uncontestable fact of 
empiricism that judges may make all kinds of 
decisions based upon a wide range of factors: 
emotions, prejudices (unless they amount to a conflict 
of interest), party affiliation, rewarding campaign 
contributors, facile study of the law, liking or disliking 
the attorneys arguing a case, mere whim, and other 
bells and whistles. Law-school curriculums are then 
skewed to prepare students to argue successfully 
before judges who may only care minimally about 
what the law says.” Leading to this rather stark 
conclusion about the path of lawyers in the law [20]: 
“Better yet, once he becomes a judge, he will not have 
to pay much attention to what the lawyers say about 
the law (any more than he did in the classroom). For 
the ‘law’ will be whatever he proclaims it to be.” 
 
In considering the role of uncertainty, which naturally 
flows from the topic of making predictions (this will 
be future explored in Section 3), it is insightful to 
consider that if the law is predicated on the courts and 
the ruling of judges, the public then would presumably 
be keenly focused on the present probability of the 
predicted outcome of the court and the judges, more so 
than the law per se [20]: “In short, it is the present 
probability of what the court will do that is of great 
interest to the bad man rather than the future fact of 
what the court will decide because by then it will be 
too late to influence the bad man’s decision in the 
present.” 
 
As a vivid illustration of this point about assessing the 
present probability of a future predicted event, 
D’Amato offers this illustration [20]: “To this Holmes 
may have added that all decisions, not just those with 
legal consequences, are based on probabilities. For 
example, a jaywalker decides to cross the street. He 
figures that his chances of reaching the other side are 
99.99% He has allowed 0.01% for the possibility that 
he will stumble halfway through and be run over by a 
passing car. On top of that calculation he must also 
consider the probability of being arrested for 
jaywalking—an arrest that would defeat his purpose of 
crossing the street in between the traffic signals. He 
looks around and does not see a police officer. 
Nevertheless, he has to allocate some degree of 
probability that a police officer may be standing 
behind a truck parked on the other side of the street. 
Thus his probability of successfully jaywalking 
reduces from 99.99% to, say, 97%. This probability 
may or may not lead him to decide to jaywalk. There 
may be other factors that enter into his decision. Every 
one of those factors can be measured as a numerical 
probability. His decision whether or not to jaywalk, 
just like every other decision he makes or will ever 
make, is based on the summation of all the relevant 
probabilities of which he is aware at the time he makes 
his decision.” 
 
In short, this aptly sums up the viewpoint about the 
role of prediction and the law [20]:  
 
“We cannot know exactly what the law is right now 
when we want to factor it into our decision whether to 
act or not to act, but we can assign a numerical 
prediction in the present to what a court will later 
decide and treat the prediction as the law.” 
 
This discussion about Holmes perhaps makes 
abundantly clear that the act of prediction and the role 
of Legal Judgment Prediction have merit, substantially 
so, and presumably can be said to be at the core of the 
law, including both the theory of the law and the 
practice of the law. 
 
For those that at times suggest that Legal Judgment 
Prediction only needs to consider the courts and the 
judges, omitting entirely the law itself, under the guise 
that the law will be whatever the courts say it to be, 
this seems somewhat misguided as a rule of thumb. 
The law still is nonetheless the essence of what is 
relied upon, and for which the courts and the judges 
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will presumably emanate from, and thus acting as 
though for LJP purposes that the laws are unworthy of 
inclusion seems an extreme and relatively imprudent 
posture. In that same view, perhaps, taking the extreme 
of only relying upon the laws as written would seem to 
be missing the boat, as it were, neglecting to take into 
account the role and impact of the decisions made by 
the courts and the judges. All told, attempting to 
portray the law and the courts/judges as somehow 
mutually exclusive when undertaking LJP seems 
exceedingly ill-advised. 
 
In any case, the Holmes exploration has also 
highlighted the importance of realizing that predictions 
via Legal Judgment Prediction are not to be cast as 
imbuing absolute certainty and that there needs to be 
the realization and infusion of probabilities in order to 
consider the predictions of proper value and utility. 
 
 
2 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [27] [28] [29] 
[30] [31] [32].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
 
 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
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2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [22] [23] [24]. Essentially, this 
entails any AI legal reasoning capacities that can 
operate autonomously, entirely so, but that is only able 
to do so in some limited or constrained legal domain. 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
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3 Legal Judgement Prediction and AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
In this Section 3, various aspects of Legal Judgment 
Prediction (LJP) will be identified and discussed with 
respect to AI Legal Reasoning (AILR). A series of 
diagrams and illustrations are included to aid in 
depicting the points being made. In addition, the 
material draws upon the background and LJP research 
literature indicated in Section 1 and combines with the 
material outlined in Section 2 on the Levels of 
Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning. 
 
3.1 LJP and LoA AILR 
 
The nature and capabilities of Legal Judgment 
Prediction will vary across the Levels of Autonomy 
for AI Legal Reasoning.  
 
Refer to Figure B-1. 
 
As indicated, the Legal Judgment Prediction becomes 
increasingly more sophisticated and advanced as the 
AI Legal Reasoning increases in capability. To aid in 
typifying the differences between each of the Levels in 
terms of the incremental advancement of LJP, the 
following phrasing is used: 
• Level 0: n/a 
• Level 1: Rudimentary Calculative 
• Level 2: Complex Statistical 
• Level 3: Symbolic Intertwined 
• Level 4: Domain Predictive 
• Level 5: Holistic Predictive 
• Level 6: Pansophic Predictive 
 
Briefly, each of the levels is described next. 
 
At Level 0, there is an indication of “n/a” at Level 0 
since there is no AI capability at Level 0 (the No 
Automation level of the LoA). 
 
At Level 1, the LoA is Simple Assistance Automation 
and this can be used to undertake Legal Judgment 
Prediction though it is rated or categorized as being 
rudimentary and making use of relatively simplistic 
calculative models and formulas. Thus, this is coined 
as “Rudimentary Calculative.” 
 
At Level 2, the LoA is Advanced Assistance 
Automation and the LJP is coined as “Complex 
Statistical,” which is indicative of Legal Judgment 
Prediction being performed in a more advanced 
manner than at Level 1. This consists of complex 
statistical methods such as those techniques mentioned 
in Section 1 of this paper. To date, most of the 
research and practical use of Legal Judgment 
Prediction has been within Level 2. Future efforts are 
aiming at Level 3 and above. 
 
At Level 3, the LoA is Semi-Autonomous Automation 
and the LJP is coined as “Symbolic Intermixed,” 
which can undertake Legal Judgment Prediction at an 
even more advanced capacity than at Level 2. Recall, 
in Level 2, the focus tended to be on traditional 
numerical formulations for LJP, albeit sophisticated in 
the use of statistical models. In Level 3, the symbolic 
capability is added and fostered, including at times 
acting in a hybrid mode with the conventional 
numerical and statistical models. Generally, the work 
at Level 3 to-date has primarily been experimental, 
making use of exploratory prototypes or pilot efforts. 
 
At Level 4, the LoA is AILR Domain Autonomous and 
coined as “Domain Predictive,” meaning that this can 
be used to perform Legal Judgment Predictions within 
particular specialties of domains or subdomains of the 
legal field, but does not necessarily cut across the 
various domains and is not intended to be able to do 
so. The predictive capacity is done in a highly 
advanced manner, incorporating the Level 3 
capabilities, along with exceeding those levels and 
providing a more fluent and capable predictive means. 
 
At Level 5, the LoA is AILR Fully Autonomous and 
coined as “Holistic Predictive,” meaning that the use 
of Legal Judgment Predictions can go across all 
domains and subdomains of the legal field. The 
predictive capacity is done in a highly advanced 
manner, incorporating the Level 4 capabilities, along 
with exceeding those levels and providing a more 
fluent and capable predictive means. 
 
At Level 6, the LoA is AILR Superhuman 
Autonomous, which as a reminder from Section 2 is 
not a capability that exists and might not exist, though 
it is included as a provision in case such a capability is 
ever achieved. In any case, the Legal Judgment 
Prediction at this level is considered “Pansophic 
Predictive” and would encapsulate the Level 5 
capabilities, and then go beyond that in a manner that 
would leverage the AI superhuman capacity. 
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3.2 Legal Judgment Prediction: Approaches 
Utilized 
 
Based on the discussion in Section 1, it is useful to 
consider the overarching nature of the approaches 
utilized in ascertaining Legal Judgment Prediction 
efforts. 
 
Refer to Figure B-2. 
 
As indicated, within the overall legal milieu there are 
the laws and the courts, of which there are then legal 
outcomes that are derived and produced. Presumably, 
the laws are made by lawmakers, while the courts 
consist of judges in the role of law-appliers (see 
Section 1 for further explanation about these matters). 
 
For any given specific legal case, the goal of Legal 
Judgment Prediction is ostensibly to predict the legal 
outcome of that particular legal case.  
 
The predictive approach typically uses as key factors: 
• Case-Specific Legal Factors 
• Judge-Specific Legal Factors 
• Exogenous Factors 
• Other 
 
In the case-specific legal factors, the data or 
information collected, assessed, and used for making 
the outcome prediction is often quantified numerically. 
As per the discussion in Section 1, this might include 
codifying the factors into binary numeric values, 
stratified ranges, and so on. Also, there are linguistic 
bases for conducting the predictive efforts, involving 
examining the linguistical nuances and nature of the 
case. There is also the symbolic understanding 
approach that attempts to go beyond the traditional 
numeric or quantified approaches and seemingly 
include some form of comprehension toward the 
symbolic nature of the elements involved to make 
predictions. 
 
Per the points made in Section 3, the judge-specific 
factors can also be included in the effort to undertake 
Legal Judgment Predictions. These can be categorized 
into two major sets, consisting of judicial oriented 
factors (such as the prior rulings of the judge) and 
extra-judicial oriented factors (e.g., what the judge ate 
for breakfast, which is an oft used exemplar). 
 
Exogenous factors consist of elements that are beyond 
those of the case-specific and judge-specific, such as 
considering societal matters, socio-economic aspects, 
and the like. 
 
Consider next some variants and additional 
considerations about the various factors and their 
usage. 
 
As indicated in Figure B-3, for those that argue that 
judges are apt to be “lawmakers” rather than solely 
acting as law-appliers, it would imply that the judge-
specific factors become even more predominant and 
crucial than otherwise might be the case. 
 
To further illustrate this perspective about Legal 
Judgment Prediction, consider the illustrations shown 
in Figure B-4. 
 
 All else being equal, it might be the case that the 
focus of the Legal Judgment Prediction would be 
based primarily on the laws themselves and less so 
than the courts, assuming that the courts are 
considered as consisting of law-appliers rather than as 
lawmakers. For the viewpoint that the courts and 
judges are actually working in a lawmaking capacity, 
presumably, the focus of Legal Judgment Prediction 
would center on the judges, more so than the laws 
themselves. 
 
3.3 Four-Square Grid of Judicial Role 
 
The discussion in Section 3.2 can be further extended. 
 
Refer to Figure B-5. 
 
This depicts a grid consisting of four quadrants. 
 
Along the horizontal axis, there are two ways of 
interpreting the role of the judiciary, either as strictly 
law-appliers or as lawmakers. On the vertical axis, 
there are two ways shown that the law itself might be 
construed, either consisting of resolute law (as devised 
by legislative lawmakers) or as a kind of legal 
scaffolding (meaning that the law is malleable and 
porous). 
 
The two horizontal and two vertical indications allow 
for a four-square quadrant representation and thus the 
grid as depicted. 
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In theory, the notion of judges as strictly being law-
appliers can be mated with the notion of a resolute law 
facet, and thus the upper left quadrant that is labeled as 
V1 and indicated as “The Conventional Assumption.” 
This square consists of the perspective that the courts 
and judges act to operationalize the law, rather than to 
make law per se. 
 
Considered a more contemporary view is the square 
labeled as V2, in the lower right quadrant of the grid. 
This is the veritable “law is what the courts say it is” 
positioning, consisting of the judges as lawmakers and 
the law being perceived or acted upon as though it is 
malleable and porous. 
 
This leaves two additional squares of the quadrant. 
 
The lower left of the grid consists of the judges as 
lawmakers which is mated with the resolute law 
notion. As stated, this generally creates an inherent 
conflict, due to the possibility of essentially having 
two cooks in the kitchen, as it were. 
 
Finally, the upper right grid indicates the judges as 
strictly law-appliers when mated with the law as 
scaffolding. It can be argued that this creates the 
possibility of a legal void in the law. Inevitably, there 
are likely pressures that would come to bear as to 
seeking to close or narrow the void. The intrinsic 
tension is whether the courts and judges are the 
appropriate void fillers, or whether the lawmakers of 
the legislative are the appropriate void fillers, or some 
combination thereof. 
 
3.4 Legal Case Lifecycle Aspects 
 
An important aspect of Legal Judgment Prediction 
consists of the legal case timeline and the stage at 
which a prediction is being rendered and the target 
stage of the prediction. 
 
Much of the research described in Section 1 was 
generally based on the assumption that a prediction is 
to be rendered at the start of a case and the target is the 
outcome of the case. This though is somewhat 
amorphous and ill-specified and can be reconsidered 
more comprehensively by considering the full 
lifecycle of a legal case. 
 
Refer to Figure B-6. 
 
Consider these key junctures in a legal case: 
• Pre-Case 
• Case Start 
• Case Underway 
• Case Outcome (initial) 
• Case Appeal #1 
• Case Appeal #N 
• Case Outcome (final) 
 
It could be that before a legal case even gets started, 
there is interest in undertaking a Legal Judgment 
Prediction, thus it would be considered as occurring at 
a pre-case juncture of the legal case lifecycle. This 
differs by definition from making a prediction once a 
case has already started, and also implies that there is 
likely more known about the case once it has started 
versus when it is in a pre-case mode. 
 
In terms of predicting the outcome of the legal case, it 
could be that the prediction is aimed at the initial 
outcome of the case, and for which the case might 
continue under appeal, gradually and ultimately 
coming to a final outcome. Thus, it can be ambiguous 
to refer to a case outcome without clarifying which 
such outcome the prediction is aiming to derive. 
 
Refer next to Figure B-7. 
 
It is often assumed that the start of the case is the 
prediction deriving juncture, and the target of the 
prediction is the legal case outcome. Though this is 
likely a popular choice of the junctures, it is not 
necessarily the only manner of choice available. In 
short, at any juncture in the legal case lifecycle, a 
Legal Judgment Prediction might be rendered. 
 
Thus, a legal case might already be underway and 
there is interest in predicting the initial case outcome. 
 
Note that this points out too that a target aim can be an 
intermediate state of the legal case and not solely the 
end state of the legal case. 
 
For the convenience of reference, Figure B-7 indicates 
each of the primary junctures as “Jx” whereby the “x” 
is indicative of a simple numbering of the junctures. 
This is not meant to be definitive and merely 
showcases that a numbering scheme can be used to 
label the stages or phases of a legal case throughout its 
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lifecycle. A legal case could be subdivided into any 
number Z of junctures (rather than the seven indicated 
in this example), and thus at any juncture, a prediction 
can seek to be rendered for some Z+y number of 
junctures ahead in the lifecycle. 
 
Presumably, the tighter the range between the juncture 
of the prediction and the juncture of the target stage, 
the more accurate the prediction can be, assuming all 
else is equal therein, and likewise that the further 
along the case is in the lifecycle and thus the higher at 
which the juncture Z is utilized as a point at which to 
render a prediction the more accurate the prediction 
can be, all else being equal. 
 
As mentioned in Section 4 about future research, these 
postulations about the points at which Legal Judgment 
Prediction is rendered and targeted are deserving of 
further research and empirical study. 
 
3.5 Aims of the Prediction Targeting 
 
Much of the research literature depicted in Section 1 
has been varied as to what the nature of the legal case 
outcome is to consist of. In other words, it could be 
that the outcome is solely about whether the case has 
been ruled in favor or opposition. And though that is 
obviously a vital element for an outcome, it is not the 
only such element, and thus it is useful to consider the 
other elements that might also be considered as 
prediction targets. 
 
Refer to Figure B-8. 
 
As indicated, the legal case outcome can consist of a 
variety of aspects, including but limited to: 
• Prevailing Party 
• Mistrial 
• Settlement 
• Case Dropped 
• Verdict 
• Penalty 
• Etc. 
 
The use of Legal Judgment Prediction can consist of 
aiming at only one of those such outcomes, or more 
than one, and/or a combination of those potential 
outcomes. Research on the nature of LJP can better be 
utilized by clarifying what the outcome(s) are that are 
being targeted and also the differences, if any, in how 
to undertake LJP depending upon the outcome(s) 
being targeted (this is a recommendation also made in 
Section 4 on further research). 
 
There are additional targets to be considered. 
 
One is the legal case rationale, which consists of why 
the outcome was ascertained, or at least a predicted 
rationale (whether it was the true basis is another 
question altogether, of course). 
 
Legal Judgment Prediction can also be called upon to 
predict the legal case costs, the legal case effort, the 
legal case rationale, and so on. 
 
And, as mentioned in Section 3.4, keep in mind that 
these predictive matters can occur at any given 
juncture Z of the legal case lifecycle and be targeting 
some Z+y juncture, and does not suggest that it is 
always and only at the start and nor always and only 
targeting the final state. 
 
3.6 LJP And Basket Or Bundling of Legal Cases 
 
Generally, most of the research literature indicated in 
Section 1 has primarily focused on using Legal 
Judgment Prediction for taking a specific legal case 
and predicting the outcome of that specific case. 
 
Legal Judgment Prediction can also be utilized in a 
basket or bundling manner. 
 
Refer to Figure B-9. 
 
As shown, a set of legal cases might be clumped 
together in a basket of legal cases, or considered a 
bundle of legal cases, and as a set be used to predict a 
legal outcome that is anticipated to be the singular 
outcome applicable to each member of the set. 
 
Thus, there is one singular outcome, and for which it 
applies presumably to each of the legal cases of the 
devised set. 
 
Doing this kind of basket or bundling has its own 
complexities and facets, thus, it is worthwhile to 
highlight that this is another form in which Legal 
Judgment Prediction can be utilized, and ergo can be 
studied as a variant thereof. 
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3.7 Additional Crucial Facets 
 
To further aid in identifying facets that are crucial to 
the maturity of Legal Judgement Prediction, consider 
the elements indicated in Figure B-10. 
 
The elements shown include: 
• Transparency 
• Actor Predictors 
• Biases Handling 
• Probabilistic Tendencies 
Consider each of these elements. 
 
• Transparency.  
 
In brief, one consideration involves the 
transparency involved in a Legal Judgment 
Prediction. The method used for the LJP might be 
available for inspection and fully transparent, or it 
might be a Black Box that is considered opaque. 
Another facet is whether the LJP can explain how 
it worked, or whether it might be inscrutable or 
lacking in being able to be interpreted. 
 
• Actor Predictors 
 
In brief, the question arises as to how the Legal 
Judgment Prediction will be carried out. This can 
consist of a human-only based prediction, an AI-
only based prediction, or a human and AI jointly 
undertaken prediction. 
 
• Biases Handling 
 
In brief, there are many aspects to be addressed 
regarding the potential for biases being an 
ingredient within a Legal Judgment Prediction. 
There can be hidden biases, which can distort or 
alter the nature of the prediction and the predictive 
capacity. There can be explicitly noted biases, 
which then need to be considered in light of the 
predictions rendered. Various bias correction 
methods and approaches can be utilized. And so 
on. 
 
• Probabilistic Tendencies 
 
Much of the research literature as depicted in 
Section 1 does not especially bring forth the aspect 
that the prediction is undoubtedly one of a 
probabilistic nature. In a sense, without explicitly 
mentioning the certainty or uncertainty of a 
prediction, the default tends to imply that the 
certainty is complete, though this is rarely the 
likely case. As such, it is vital to acknowledge and 
recognize the uncertainties involved and then 
indicate what those consist of, along with how the 
certainty can be impacted by the methods used in 
the course of the Legal Judgment Prediction. 
 
 
3.8 AILR and LJP Impact 
 
An important consideration worth exploring is the 
over-time judicial reliance upon human judicial 
judgment versus AILR capabilities. 
 
Refer to Figure B-11. 
 
A graph is portrayed that consists of the magnitude of 
judicial reliance on the Y-axis (ranging from low to 
high), while time is exhibited on the X-axis. Time is 
indicated as beginning at t-0 and proceeding forward 
in time, of which there are two especially salient 
points in time marked, consisting of time t-r and time 
t-u, explained momentarily. 
 
A dashed line representing the reliance upon human 
judicial judgment is shown as starting at the high 
position on the Y-axis and then proceeding in a 
sloping downward motion over-time, inexorably 
proceeding toward the lower ends of reliance.  
 
Meanwhile, a second line is shown as starting at the 
origin point of zero, proceeding on an upward slope 
over-time, and indicative of the AILR capabilities that 
will presumably increase over time and thus it is 
assumed there will be an increasing reliance upon the 
AILR for participating in or providing judicial 
judgment.  
 
Note that the graph is not drawn to scale and is 
intended merely as an overall gauge or macroscopic 
illustration of the issues being discussed herein. 
 
At some point in time, designated as t-r, the reliance 
upon AILR begins to exceed the reliance upon human 
judicial judgment (so postulated). 
 
It is not a foregone conclusion that this will necessarily 
occur and purely indicated as worthwhile for 
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discussion. Likewise, it is not necessarily the case that 
the rising AILR reliance necessitates a reducing 
reliance on human judicial judgment, though this is the 
postulated theory that oft is argued about the gradual 
advance of AILR. 
 
After passing the crossover, there is a Zone S, into 
which it is possible that the problematic aspects of 
performing Legal Judgment Prediction might wane, 
due to the facet that the AILR is becoming dominant 
in the reliance upon rendering judicial decisions and 
(if one assumes) the AILR will be explicative and thus 
presumably transparent. This transparency would 
suggest that predicting what the AILR is going to 
judicial proffer is much more predictable and 
straightforward (though, not necessarily the case if the 
AILR has been allowed to become opaque or 
otherwise closed in its inner workings). 
 
The line representing the reliance upon human judicial 
judgment does not touch the X-axis as it is unknown 
as to whether there would ever be a point at which all 
human judicial judgment would be no longer utilized 
such that only AILR was utilized (this is a classic open 
debate). 
 
 
4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier indicated, Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) 
is a longstanding and open issue in the theory and 
practice-of-law. Predicting the nature and outcomes of 
judicial matters is important. Intrinsically, generating 
judicially laden predictions has been limited in utility 
and exactitude, as illustrated via the literature review 
of Section 1. Though various methods and techniques 
to predict legal cases and judicial actions have 
emerged over time, especially arising via the advent of 
computer-based modeling, including simple 
calculative methods to highly sophisticated and 
complex statistical models, much still needs to be done 
to improve LJP.  
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based approaches have 
been increasingly utilized and will undoubtedly have a 
pronounced impact on how LJP is performed and its 
predictive accuracy. Per Section 3, Legal Judgment 
Prediction can holistically be understood by using the 
Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning, 
plus, other considerations are further to be advanced, 
including LJP probabilistic tendencies, biases 
handling, actor predictors, transparency, judicial 
reliance, legal case outcomes, and other crucial 
elements entailing the overarching legal judicial 
milieu. 
 
Future research is needed to explore in greater detail 
the manner and means by which AI-enablement will 
occur in the law along with the potential for both 
positive and adverse consequences in LJP. 
Autonomous AILR is likely to materially impact the 
effort, theory, and practice of Legal Judgment 
Prediction, including as a minimum playing a notable 
or possibly even pivotal role in such advancements. 
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